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Hidden Conflicts and Journalistic Norms: The Case of Self-Coverage
Abstract
Because news and entertainment firms are increasingly under the same corporate umbrellas, it is likely that
reporting by journalists on the cultural products and activities of their affiliated companies will rise. The
theme of this study is that the phenomenon of reporting on one's own company is best understood through
perspectives on goal conflict and organizational culture. The article argues the need to modify contemporary
scholarly contentions that news firms expect open conflict between reporters and their superiors on policy
issues. Interviews at two daily newspapers and Time magazine support the theoretically based proposition that
investigation of their own organizations is very much an area where journalists draw away from confronting
key professional conflicts. Centering on phenomena such as silent bargains and silent routines, the study
suggests how conflicts about self-coverage are managed and how this conflict management is tied to larger
dynamics of organizational control.
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This study explores how activities surrounding newsworkers' coverage o f  
their o w n  firms relates t o  the phenomenon o f  hidden conflicts in organi- 
zations, and it suggests what difference that makes for journalistic output.  
Though not new,  self-cover:ige by news organizations is more likely t o  
occur in the future than in earlier clecacles I>eca~ise o f  major transforma- 
tions within the rnedia system. Several forecasters project that by  the end 
of the decade :ihout :i half dozen huge firms. at most, will dominate the 
mainstream o f  news and  entertainment in the LJnited States and  around 
the world (Ellirnan, 1000). 1Secause news and entertainment organizations 
will increasingly he  under  the s:iiiie corporate umbrella, i t  seems reason- 
able to suggest that reporting b y  journalists on the cultural products and 
activities of their affiliated companies will rise. 
Some of the tensions have already bubbled into public view. Perhaps 
the most visible incident was the controversy over Time magazine's cov- 
erage of its parent firm's purchase of Warner Communications in 1989. 
ccused Time's editors and writers o f  tilting their reporting 
of the merger toward the public relations needs of their parent firm 
(Bruck, 1990; Cohen, 1992). In trade magazines and academic writings, 
the incident stimulated concern about situations in which loyalty to the 
parent company faces off against a mandate to report the news impartial- 
ly. It sparked arguments about the implications of competing business 
and editorial values in news organizations (Ciabattari, 1989). 
Despite such discussions, little thought has been given to the way this 
sort of tension relates to other types of conflicts in news organizations. 
Nor  has attention been paid to the way in which the increased potential 
for covering oneself in the new media environment has actually affected 
the activities of newsworkers. The purpose of this article is to provide a 
theoretical framework for addressing these issues, supported by ex- 
ploratory research that involved interviews with journalists at two nation- 
ally prominent newspapers and at Time magazine. 
tentions that news firms expect to see open conflict on policy issues be- 
tween reporters and their superiors. The article agrees with contemporary 
opinion that organizational argumentation represents the norm rather 
than (as writers o f  earlier decades contended) the exceptions in news or- 
ganizations. Yet it departs from contemporary writings in suggesting the 
importance of understanding when, why, and how reporters and their su- 
periors pull back from conflict-laden discussions about their work. 
The research indicates that investigation o f  their own organizations is 
very much an area where journalists draw away from confronting key 
professional conflicts. When it comes t o  self-coverage, organizational 
processes typically serve both to obstruct the activity and to mute ten- 
sions about that ohstruction. At the same time, the study finds that the 
very forces that discourage journalists from investigating their own firms 
o r  talking about them sometimes do allow-or, in the case of Time, feel 
compelled to allow-certain types o f  self-coverage. Centering on phe- 
nomena such as silent bargains and silent routines, the study suggests 
how conflicts about self-coverage are managed and how this conflict 
management is tied to larger dynamics of organizational control. 
The study argues the need t o  modify contemporary scholarly con- 
Tracking Internal Dissension 
The existence and nature of conflicts between journalists and their 
sources has long been a topic o f  much interest in studies of newswork 
(Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Lippmann, 1922; Rosten, 1937; Sigal, 1973) 
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When it comes to conflicts within news firms, however, the scholarly lit- 
erature is much less abundant (Schudson, 1792). Nevertheless, it is possi- 
ble t o  note an  important change in scholarly perspectives on  the perva- 
siveness and significance o f  internal conflicts. 
Before the late 1970s, academics 11y and large agreed that journalists 
learn their firms’ news policies through a socialization process genc~al ly  
free of open ,  ongoing cluarrels between reporters and those w h o  hire 
them. To be sure, researchers noted that conflicts over resource priorities 
and turf is a common occurrence within and  hetween news departments 
(Keese 8; Shoemaker, 1971; Tunstall, 1971). Moreover, rese:irchers agreed 
that potential for overt conflict within newsrooms over news policies 
does exist. Yet they argued that policy fights within neaw-ooms between 
reporters and  editors or  publishcrs were held at bay through compromis- 
ing (Gans, 1779). trying furtively t o  blunt the corners of policy (Breed, 
1760; Tunstall, 19711, quitting the organization (Hirschman, 19701, or  s i n -  
ply abiding the policy to keep  a job (Breed, 1960). 
Sigelman (1973) proposed that in many news organizations conflicts 
were kept to a minimum through “organizational processes which are 
structured to avoid conflict hetwecn reporters and their superiors” (p.  
132). He argued that self-selection o f  individuals for reportorial positions, 
hiring decisions h y  editors, and the matching o f  stories and reporters by 
the editors were mechanisms that reduced the chance o f  clashes between 
journalistic superiors and  subordinates. When h e  and other researchers 
did mention outright attempts by  journalists t o  argue openly among them- 
selves and with their bosses over policies, they portrayed these incidents 
as  unusual-as, for example, in a review o f  the way women journalists 
brought coverage o f  the women’s movement into The New York Times 
(Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1977). 
This idea that overt conflict o v e r  policies is unusual and temporary in 
news organizations has been challenged persuasively in recent academic 
writings about news. Following in the footsteps of a much earlier essay 
by Stark (1962), researchers have begun to  stress that overt divisions be- 
tween reporters and their superiors over news goals and norms exist con- 
tinually in many newsrooms along lines o f  class, gender., race, and ethnic- 
ity (Johnson, 1993; Lule,  1992). Comparing the current stress o n  conflict 
to the many earlier writings that emphasized few obvious tensions, it is 
tempting to suggest that part o f  the difference in findings is due to the 
fact that journalism firms today do actually embody more conflicts than in 
earlier decades. One  reason may be that, as  Hallin (1986) notes, the trend 
over the course of the twentieth century has been toward journalists’ in- 
creast:d demand for professional autonomy from their firms’ business in- 
terests. Another cause may l x  that some newsrooms have l x c o m e  more 
diverse than before, 21s women and ,  inore slowly, minorities have loecn 
entering journalism (Weaver 8; Wilhoit, 1986). As these groups have been 
moving into mainstream news firms, they have been forming coalitions t o  
change certain policies and force the airing of certain views. 
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Hidden Conflicts 
At the same time, other contemporary news scholars (Bantz, 1984; Dim- 
mick, 1979) insist that overt conflicts over news goals and norms always 
have been and always will be at the core o f  newswork. Their implication 
is that researchers in earlier decades simply were not tuned in or  privy to  
the continuing and widespread nature o f  these quarrels. Bantz, for exam- 
ple, sees ;t patterned “culture o f  conflict” over resources and policies as 
typical o f  newswork. Journalists, he  notes, revel in their attachment to a 
journalism profession that extends beyond their organization, in k i n g  
known for the pursuit of news values rather than audience (or  organiza- 
tional) values. in aggressively exploring stories at the expense of colle- 
giality, and in showing concern for news goals at the expense of husiness 
goals. He contends that the seeds o f  open organizational conflict lie in all 
these values. 
Hantz adds that cooperation is a way that newsworkers attempt inter- 
mittently to manage their many conflicts with superiors and colleagues s o  
that their organization can create its product and compete with other or- 
ganizations. He emphasizes that despite cooperative hehavior newswork- 
ers acknowledge the widespread and open  nature of their organizational 
conflict. He states that, whereas such quarreling is not defined as accept- 
able in many sorts o f  organizations, all sorts o f  conflict are accepted as a 
routine, even a good and necessary, fact o f  life in journalism firms. By 
which he  means that journalism organizations as a class acknowledge that 
interpersonal disagreements about the goals and norms o f  newswork lie 
at the very center o f  what it means t o  be a journalist. 
This contemporary stress on  organizational conflicts and their implica- 
tions has opened new avenues f o r  studying the news process and its 
products. It raises questions, for example, about the nature and formation 
o f  newsroom coalitions and the role o f  disenfranchised groups in the 
newsroom. Too, it  encourages a reexamination o f  popular histories o f  
news (Friendly, 1967; Gates, 1078; Keeler, 1990; Robertson, 1992; Sper- 
ber, 1986) through a scholarly prism o f  conflict as the norm rather than 
the exception. Yet just as  the academic writings prior to the late 1070s 
may have placed too great an emphasis on  consensus in the newsroom, 
so the contemporary emphasis on  open  conflict may obscure important 
circumstances in which organizations are afraid to openly acknowledge 
tensions and stir up  arguments. 
Newswork and Hidden Conflicts 
The existence o f  such circumstanccs is suggested by a relatively recent 
l x i t  growing literature on  what have been called hidden conflicts in orga- 
nizations ( K o l h  W Rartunek, 1992). The phrase has been used to describe 
frictions in organizations that do not match the formal, rational, and col- 
lectively recognized dissensions that academic writers have traditionally 
addressed. Lately, an increasing numher of researchers have turned their 
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attentions to important ongoing conflicts over goals and norms that take 
place informally and privately, “in the nooks and crannies o f  organiza- 
tions” (Kolb  & Bartunek, 1992, p. viii). The people involved d o  not ac- 
knowledge the frictions publicly, often out o f  fear that doing so might 
threaten their organization’s stability ancl, ultimately, their own profes- 
siona 1 situation s. 
’The act o f  reporting on one’s own organization would seem t o  he one 
area where conflicts cannot be acknowledged openly. It would seem that 
conflict over goals and norms could be tolerated, even celebrated, only 
when the essential purpose of the activities is to cover the outside world. 
The reason is that the conflict ove r  news values as well as collegial com- 
petition can be seen by management and newsworkers alike as contribut- 
ing individually and collectively to the reputation and profits of the jour- 
nalist’s own organization. When reporting is turned inward, though, 
management and newsworkers alike might sometimes see the costs as far 
outweighing the benefits. 
They might, for  example, see certain kinds of reporting on their own 
organization as opening the journalism firm t o  scrutiny from the outside 
world, resulting in a possible loss of prestige and profits. From this point 
of view, the journalistic values that encourage organization;rl conflict may 
lose their weight. Both management and newsworkers might consider 
them selfish concerns that should riot supersede the reporter’s presumed 
goal o f  long-term health for the news organization ancl its employees. At 
the same time, xknowledgment that a news firm considers a topic off- 
limits might so conflict with the image news organizations want to project 
to themselves and others that both parties might share an interest in not 
admitting t o  themselves o r  others that those limits exist. 
The way organizations manage such tensions without open discussion 
about them is a subject that is on ly  beginning t o  get sustained attention. 
Strauss (1978) suggests a useful direction b y  noting that one way to keep 
conflicts from becoming public is by engaging in silent bargains. An ex- 
ample is when an elderly patient makes an implicit agreement with a hos- 
pital caretaker t o  complain relatively little about pain in return fo r  compa- 
ny and friendly relations. Here the caretaker’s conflicting goals o f  
compassionate care and rapid work completion meet the patient’s con- 
flicting goals of pain reduction and companionship in a lonely situation. 
Both have a vested interest in resolving their internal and interpersonal 
conflicts in a way that does not open up the difficulties to painful discus- 
sion; the caretaker does not want to admit goals beyond professional aid 
and the patient feels that begging for companionship might drive the 
would-t>e companion away. In the end, it is the caretaker’s power over 
the patient that sets the key terms o f  the hidden bargain that holds bene- 
fits for both. 
and political considerations” guide the amount of argumentation and its 
openness in organizations. Silent lxtrgains, he indicates, conie about 
As this example suggests, Strauss understands that “power, domination, 
Hidden Conflicts 
when parties to a conflict over goals o r  norms both have a vested interest 
in the fiction that nothing has gone awry in the organization or in their re- 
lationship. While explicit negotiations do not take place, he says, each 
party respects the other’s stakes in the game o f  mutual pretense, “but only 
up to the limits set by whoever was more powerful in setting those limits” 
(p. 254) .  The result o f  this ritual drama of pretense is that the parties to 
these hidden conflicts manage the tensions in ways which suit particular 
agendas while not making public issues of them. 
Strauss’s approach lends interesting insight into the process of manag- 
ing conflicts that members of organizations tacitly agree must be sup- 
pressed. At the same time, a major difficulty of suggesting that Strauss’s 
model can be applied directly to understanding the phenomenon of cov- 
ering oneself is that his notion of silent bargains relies almost exclusively 
on dyadic interactions between superior and subordinate members of an 
organization to suppress highly charged tensions over norms and goals. It 
would seem reasonable to suggest that if organization-wide mechanisms 
could be seen that discourage certain types of reporting while keeping 
that prohibition beneath the surface, the mechanisms would involve in- 
teractions among newsworkers of the same status as well as those in dif- 
ferent levels of the hierarchy. 
The present study aimed, then, to ask two questions. First, to what ex- 
tent do mechanisms exist within news organizations to discourage inves- 
tigations of their own firms and to mute conflicts about the topic? And 
second, if such mechanisms do exist, what are they, how are they dif- 
fused, and how do they influence journalistic behavior and products? 
In-Depth Interviews 
To begin addressing the questions, this exploratory study focused on 
three apparent exceptions: news sources that had published articles 
about themselves. As Tuchman (1977) notes, “exceptions enable the ob- 
server to perceive and so to examine hidden structures, ideologies, and 
powers” (p. 43). For this investigation, one exception was Timemaga- 
zine, which had not only carried controversial articles about its parent 
firm’s purchase of Warner Communications, but had printed reviews and 
articles about movies, books, and other products created by other Time 
Warner divisions. The other apparent aberrations were prominent dailies 
that had published investigative articles about newsmaking in which the 
papers publishing the articles had been discussed. 
The journalists who wrote the newspaper pieces were interviewed at 
length to determine why and how those pieces were written, the extent 
o f  deviation from their firms’ norms about covering oneself, and whether 
the pieces caused major problems in their wake. At Time Warner, inter- 
views were conducted with two Time writers, one editor, three marketing 
executives, and two corporate communication executives. They took 
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place during summer 1991, fall 1991, and winter 1992-all within two 
years of the merger. The issue o f  covering oneself was broached through 
questions about the development o f  articles in which Time Warner 
movies and books were featured prominently. Those interviewed were 
asked about an article dealing directly with conflicts o f  interests by maga- 
zine reviewers (including those at Time). They were also questioned con- 
cerning their knowledge of self-coverage conflicts that had been swirling 
in the trade and popular press. 
The interviews averaged ahout an hour, with the longest one taking 
about an hour and a half. All ten of the people interviewed preferred to 
hold their names confidential. In fact, the two newspaper journalists 
spoke only on the condition that neither they, their newspaper, nor their 
articles would be mentioned. Both emphasized that very few articles of 
the sort they wrote are published in mainstream newspapers and that 
speaking about them even without providing their names would reveal 
who they are. 
Knowing  W h e n  Stories Are Off-Limits 
The unanimous concern for confidentiality was a measure of the sensitivi- 
ty of this topic in the news organizations studied. Four journalists in the 
group agreed that the prickly organizational tensions they were dis- 
cussing would be difficult to share publicly. Journalists in their firms, they 
believed, understand that their editors consider some types of stories off- 
limits. 
In general, the four respondents contended that trying to get editorial 
permission fo r  tough investigative reports about the goings-on in one’s 
organization, o r  one’s parent organization, would be near-futile. It would 
be just as difficult to get permission to cover organization-advertiser busi- 
ness relationships. As the journalists understood it, the reason was sim- 
ple: The stories might result in embarrassing revelations that could clis- 
turb financial relationships and so cut off important sources of revenue. 
The comments o f  the two newspaper journalists set the stage for ex- 
plaining the dynamics of this situation. Both maintained that while topics 
such as these may be part o f  the gossip mill, newsworkers would not pro- 
pose them to editors as serious story ideas. They said that for some re- 
porters-those who cover heats that have nothing to do with the gossip- 
the stated reason may be that the issue has nothing to d o  with their jobs. 
But underlying everyone’s approach to such stories, they contended, was 
fear. One fear was that the need to balance concerns about the news with 
worries about their job security and their firm’s viability might make any 
work on such a subject inadequate. Another fear was that such a submis- 
sion would brand the author as a troublemaker o r  as naive about how the 
world works. As one o f  the journalists noted, “reporters are concerned 
about their livelihood.” 
35 
The reporters indicated there was some discussion laterally in the orga- 
nizations, that is, among reporters, about goings-on in the firm that might 
be grist for their periodicals. They admitted, though, that journalists do 
not argue with each other about the importance of covering those topics. 
But despite the fact that lateral gossip is not uncommon within various or- 
ganizational levels, on a vertical ba (between reporters and the editors 
above them) it is rare. Those interviewed suspected that both reporters 
and writers feel uncomfortable talking about such things with their supe- 
riors. 
plicit discussions with one another were the immediate cause of the gen- 
eral awareness by reporters of what not to talk about with whom. Rather, 
their assimilation of these notions seemed to take place through the 
learning of what might be called silent routines. As the name implies, 
silent routines are hard to notice because they involve an absence of or- 
ganizational discussion. Journalists make attributions that their colleagues 
are averse even to talking about self-coverage by noting that it rarely 
comes up as a topic of serious discussion within the news organization. 
The perceived validity of these attributions is reinforced when they see 
little, if any, self-coverage in the paper itself. The collective attributions, 
in turn, reinforce patterns of behaviors and expectations (habits) that lead 
workers to avoid broaching subjects in situations they believe are inap- 
propriate and will get them in trouble. Thus the sensitive problem of fig- 
uring out how to investigate parts of their own company becomes a non- 
issue without much discussion. 
Their remarks suggest that neither silent bargains with superiors nor ex- 
The Exceptions, the Rules, and Silent Bargains 
Yet while the journalists suggested that silent routines carried the burden 
of keeping self-coverage and its tensions muted, their discussions of how 
the exceptions came about revealed that silent bargains between superi- 
ors and subordinates did play an important role in establishing norms of 
self-coverage. They contended that editors wanted them to see their self- 
coverage story as a painful exception to typical journalistic duties. 
The experience helped reporters understand how far they could go 
with exceptions. It also served to reinforce their sense that such coverage 
was generally a bad idea, because it placed their status as popular and 
savvy members of their organizations at risk. The silent bargain, initiated 
by the editors, was that withdrawal from this kind of reportage and future 
silence about it would reestablish the status implied in their previous 
give-and-take relationships with superiors at the papers. 
To understand where the two journalists got these ideas, consider first 
their interpretations of why the pieces covering their firms were accepted 
and what that told them about the rules of self-coverage. Some of what 
they said about getting their stories into print recalls findings by Breed 
36 
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(19601, Gans (19791, Koshco (19751, Tuchman (1979), Tunstall (1971) and 
others that reporters with special expertise can sometimes get away with 
transgressing newspaper policy. Yet there is an additional element here: 
even while exulting in the success o f  getting their ideas out ,  the reporters 
clearly revealed their inference from editors that movement away from 
self-coverage would be necessary t o  make all their professional lives easi- 
er. 
A key reason their superiors accepted their stories, they said, was that 
the articles were not primarily about their own firms. One reporter said 
he had pitched the idea to his editors as hard news that related to news- 
papers generally. The other had a related topic suggested t o  him, but then 
broadened it t o  include issues that touched on his own organization. 
In both cases the journalists said they made it clear to their liosses from 
the start that the examination o f  their organization was only to be a small 
portion o f  the piece; only a few paragraphs o f  very long articles were de- 
voted t o  material about their own firms. Moreover, as if t o  show that they 
did not feel guilty investigating their firms, both reporters said they sus- 
pected from the start that the problems they were exposing around the 
country hardly existed in their own papers. Much to their relief, this was 
confirmed in their research on their own organizations. Both werc: 
vague as to what they would have done had their investigations found 
differently. 
Another reason superiors allowed the stories, according to the journal- 
ists, was because those who suggested them had longtime heats. Both 
contended that even though their controversial proposals were not relat- 
ed directly to their heats (and in one case was far removed from it) ,  their 
solid reputations inside and outside the papers led their editors to believe 
they would write responsibly, that is, in a way that would not embarrass 
the firm. One reporter’s remarks, though, made his bosses sound espe- 
cially defensive. He sensed his editors felt that because his beat was at 
least marginally related to the topic, and because he generally had final 
control over what he said on his beat, they could disavow primary re- 
sponsibility fo r  running the article if it caused major problems with the 
publisher or corporate owners. 
Still, both newspaper journalists made it clear that as  the story pro- 
gressed, tensions that worked against its publication were ultimately 
eased by invocations o f  journalistic integrity by one o r  more editors. 
Those editors said they knew firsthand that the problems they were dis- 
cussing exist in papers throughout the country. They insisted to their 
more cautious counterparts that the topic was newsworthy, and they 
called forth journalistic values and tradition o f  the paper in arguing that 
the article ought to be published. As one of the respondents said, ‘.lJlti- 
mately, the news imperative-to allow writers to document stories well 
and stand by those stories-won out.” 
of self-coverage in a general sense, though. Despite the appearance of 
The invocation of journalistic values did not sweep away the problem 
Hidden Conflicts 
their articles, and even though they were pleased with the placement and 
length of the pieces, the journalists said they knew their superiors did not 
welcome more of the same. Their answers indicate, in fact, that at the 
same time the journalists and editors were working to bring the articles 
into print, both parties were dropping subtle and not-so-subtle cues that 
after publication it would be useful to restore the undiscussed patterns of 
behavior, the silent routines, that had deterred them from covering their 
own organization. 
The journalists said their editors were quite aware that there were other 
reporters in the firm whose beats were the most appropriate for covering 
those stories. One of the reporters noted that in his case the beat reporter 
could have claimed jurisdiction over the topic but did not. To him, and to 
the other journalist, the lack of comment from the beat reporters signaled 
what they already knew: Subjects relating to the business of newspapers 
that touch on their firms’ inner workings are too sensitive to pitch on a 
In discussing their attitudes toward pushing the stories through, both 
journalists used phrases indicating that these were special cases that took 
more than their usual effort. One, referring to his reputation and experi- 
ence, said, “The bottom line is they might lose a guy like me if they don’t 
run the story.” The other similarly said that his stature allowed him, an 
“800-pound gorilla” among reporters in the firm, to imply to his bosses, 
“This is important. I’m going to the mat on this.” Both reporters were 
quite aware, however, that “going to the mat” and implicitly threatening 
to leave are acts that must be done rarely to have their desired effect. 
In the case of one of the reporters, the cue to restore the silent routines 
if he were to retain his organizational status was virtually explicit. He had 
a particularly difficult time moving his idea from submission to final ac- 
ceptance. He asserted that while investigative pieces normally take a long 
time at his paper because a number of editors go over them quite careful- 
ly, this one took a good deal longer than was typical. Moreover, he said, 
the piece fostered more than the usual conflict among the editors as well 
as between them and him. He recalled that at one point an editor told him, 
“You’re not going to win any popularity contests writing up stories like 
this.” Although still interested in exploring the subject, he admitted that he 
was discounting his newspaper as the intended outlet and instead was 
hoping to share his ideas with academic and other specialized audiences. 
Major Conflict at Time 
These two newspaper reporters’ experiences in covering their own orga- 
nizations are examples o f  the way journalistic exceptions are both al- 
lowed as a result of explicit negotiation and cordoned off as unusual 
through silent bargains. The situation at Time can also be understood 
through the lenses of hidden conflict, silent routines, and silent bargains. 
38 
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The Time case, though, is an example o f  what happens when major orga- 
nizational traumas cause silent routines and silent bargains to break 
down. 
Those interviewed described an approach t o  self-coverage before 
Time’s union with Warner that was similar to the one confronting the 
newspaper journalists. Like the newspaper journalists, and for similar rea- 
sons, the two Time magazine writers and one editor mrho were inter- 
viewed described ;I traditional tendency toward not proposing coverage 
o f  their own firm to management. At the same time, their comments con- 
sistently suggested that a kind of silent bargain had existed with manage- 
ment that had allowed organizational pride to operate despite such self- 
censorship. 
That bargain was the implicit assurance that, as long as journalists un- 
derstood that writing a bout their own organization in the magazine was a 
bold move not t o  tie carried out o r  even suggested lightly, the firm would 
back their coverage o f  such a sensitive subject. The people interviewed 
seemed to have inferred this bargain from their company’s long-pro- 
claimed separation o f  “Church” (its editorial side) frorn “State” (its busi- 
ness side). First proclaimed b y  Time’s founder Henry Luce (who ironical- 
ly supervised tioth areas of his company) and backed up by the putative 
power of the firm’s editor-in-chief at the corporate level, proclamation of 
7ime’s separation of Church and State became a powerful way to encour- 
age loyalty to the magazine on the part of employees and the public at 
large (Ciabattari, 1989). 
I t  was, in fact, the credibility of this Church-State rhetoric that was 
questioned openly within the magazine firm as Time’s union with Warner 
took place. So ,  too, the norms that discouraged Time staffers from openly 
pitching investigative stories about their own firm became subject to in- 
tense evaluation. Part of the reason was public scrutiny. In the popular 
and trade press, the union of Time and Warner set off an explosion of 
speculation about whether combining the journalistic giant with the en- 
tertainment giant would wreak havoc on Time’s supposed Church and 
State norms. 
Rumors circulated in The New Yorker magazine and elsewhere that 
Jason McManus, Time Inc. editor-in-chief, had intervened to shape his 
flagship magazine’s coverage of the merger in ways that benefitted the 
new corporation, not journalism (Bruck, 1990). These suspicions were 
followed by allegations in a book a h u t  “the end of Time” (written by for- 
mer Time executive Clurman [1992]> that McManus had forced his editors 
to sign a promise that they would not write unfavorable things about their 
company. Such disclosures fueled speculations as to how the Time War- 
ner combination would affect the way the review sections o f  Time, Peo- 
ple, and Entertainment Weekly would consider Warner Brothers films, 
Warner books, and Warner records (Ciabattari, 1989). 
vision, other problems loomed :it least as large as the aforementioned 
This study’s interviews suggest that inside the company’s magazine di- 
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speculations. Cost reductions to help reduce merger debt instigated lay- 
offs and buyouts of many of the magazine firm’s workers. The attrition 
left the survivors feeling insecure and questioning the new firm’s commit- 
ment to its periodicals. From a strictly monetary standpoint, there was 
reason to be concerned. Before Time’s union with Warner, the division 
had brought in about 40% of Time Inc.’s revenues. In the huge new cor- 
poration, the magazines’ contribution to revenues was proportionately 
smaller, about 20%, and the general magazine business was in a reces- 
sion. 
what was now the Time Inc. Magazines unit of Time Warner came up 
with a new strategy for keeping the periodicals a key part of corporate 
thinking. They realized that Warner’s film, music, and book divisions all 
relied on consumers, not advertisers, to support their products. That pro- 
vided a wedge for the periodical’s contribution t o  the conglomerate. The 
magazine executives decided to exploit the fact that their division was the 
chief source of advertising revenues in Time Warner. They believed that 
magazines could be made credihle to the conglomerate’s chief planners if 
they could be used as magnets to attract support from international cor- 
porations for several units of the firm. In the spirit of synergy that chair- 
man Steve Ross was heralding, the magazines’ salespeople would cat- 
alyze deals with advertisers to buy space across the magazines while they 
used Warner records, books, TV shows, and even movies as promotional 
vehicles or premiums. In this way, magazines would serve as a major new 
platform on which the entertainment and promotion possibilities of the 
new conglomerate could be realized (Cappo, Danzig, & Donaton, 1990; 
Donaton, 1990; Donaton & Winters, 1990; Sarafin, 1990; Turow, 1992). 
Recognizing their loss of centrality to the firm, the marketing heads of 
Trying to Reset Norms 
In view of the reduction of editorial personnel and the repositioning of 
the magazine unit t o  fit the entertainment-and-promotion approach of the 
new firm, Time Warner’s commitment t o  separating its business from jour- 
nalistic norms was questioned inside the company as well as outside it .  
What was happening was goal conflict o f  major proportions, with poten- 
tially costly implications fo r  Time’s public image and its organizational 
cohesiveness. Comments by those interviewed and public remarks by ed- 
itors suggest that Time’s leaders tried to manage the disharmony in two 
ways: (1) by proclaiming that certain kinds of self-coverage are accept- 
able, even desirable, no matter how unfavorable the tone; and (2) by en- 
couraging plausible arguments within the firm about why such self-cover- 
age would not necessarily be tainted by conflict of interest. 
The first tack, defining certain kinds of self-coverage as desirable, was 
obviously important for a magazine with back-of-the-book reviews of 
movies, sound recordings, books, TV shows, and other facets of popular 
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culture in which Time Warner was a major player. Th’ose interviewed stat- 
ed  that the magazine’s top management had publicly assured full autono- 
my within departments for the selection o f  products and the tone of re- 
views. They were aware, too, that since the merger, the magazine had not 
shied away from covering the discord at its parent company, including 
the ouster o f  co-chairman Nick Nicholas. Particularly startling in this re- 
gard was a respectful review o f  Clurman’s To the End ?/‘Time that detailed 
power struggles within the firm before and even after the merger (Man- 
ning, 1992). In general, those interviewed said, Time management’s puh- 
lic message t o  employees and readers through such writings was that a 
harrier does indeed exist l x tween  the editorial and business sides o f  the 
company. 
Linked t o  this rehabilitation o f  the Church-and-State proclamation was 
an  argument that seems t o  have caught on  within the firm about why 
7ime magazine’s reviews o f  Time Warner movies, books, and records 
would remain free from management’s interference. Reviews were the 
most common place where Time writers’ journalistic sensibility could 
conflict with company interests. In interviews for this study. one  writer 
and both o f  the corporate communication executives gave the same ex- 
planation as  to why the company had to keep reviewing procedures hon- 
est. They contended it  would harm the magazine’s revenues in the long 
run if the reviewing process was tainted, because readers would stop 
trusting the magazine. 
To this claim that self-interest would encourage Time Warner’s suffer- 
ance of Time’s journalistic values, the writer offered a curious amend- 
ment. He remarked that Time Warner management may allow its niaga- 
zines to exercise journalistic norms in reviews because, in the end., 
management does not consider the magazines’ opinions about Time 
Warner products or  their competitors’ products all that influential: 
Time Warrzer is a iwvy big compan.y. It ouins eveyything. So everything is 
a conjict qf interest. That is to say, (f we were to wrirre something nega- 
tiue about O I W  oy’ourproducts, <f u)e u w e  to write something positive 
about one qf our competitor’sproducts, either of those could be taken as 
hurting the comnpaTz-y. Rut thepcople who run it understand that uie ’re 
trying to be.journali.sts, and they may also realize that we have very lit- 
tle impact. 
Whether or  not this startling suggestion has a basis in fact is not the 
point here. Rather, the statement should be seen as an’other argument o f -  
fered to make the firm’s new Church-State proclamation credible. From 
discussions with the people at Time, i t  seems that in conjunction with the 
editors’ publicat ion of seemingly bold articles (such as  the Clurman book 
review and the apparently frank coverage of the Nick IVicholas ouster) 
the Church-State proclamation w:is functioning t o  move the firm away 
from the dangers to organizational stability posed by the public goal con- 
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flicts. By showing and telling one  another as well as the public that Time 
Warner has no  designs on  Time’s decisions to highlight the conglomer- 
ate’s products, management and employees seemed to be trying t o  damp- 
en  the conflicts that had been threatening their status, their firm, and their 
jobs. 
N e w  Silent  Routines 
Those interviewed agreed that management’s assurances about the new 
Church-State division were not fully persuasive. Two of the writers vol- 
unteered that their reading o f  the magazine showed them that Time 
would not be honest in covering its parent. One  of them, who  was leav- 
ing the firm, specifically linked Ted Turner’s being named 1991 Man of 
The Year by Timeto relationships with the parent company (Time, 1992). 
At the time, about 30% o f  Turner Broadcasting System was owned by 
Time Warner. Time Warner’s annual reports and marketing executives had 
been making it clear that they consider their equity in the Cable News 
Network (CNN), WTBS, and Turner’s other holdings as  allowing them to 
work jointly and strategically with that firm. Calling Turner Man of the 
Year might, then, be considered an  advertisement for a Time Warner affil- 
iate. Turner’s appearance o n  the cover was accompanied by a long story 
celebrating his firm’s past, present, and future. At the same time, his con- 
nection to  Time Warner was never mentioned in the story. 
Both writers drew a similar interpretation regarding another conflict of 
interest: Time’s cover story on  author Scott Turow and his hit books Pre- 
sumed Innocent and Burden q f P r m f  (Time, 1990; Gray, 1990). During 
the week that Warner Books was releasing Presumed Innocent in paper- 
back and a few months before Warner Brothers would release the film 
version of the narrative, Timedrew up a cover story o n  the author that 
trumpeted both the book and film-but did not mention the Time Warner 
link. In interviews, people involved with the story insisted that they chose 
it on its merits, that they did not g o  out of their way to use their journalis- 
tic vehicle to  hype Warner’s entertainment products. They insisted they 
had the right to  review and highlight pieces that were created by their 
parent firm. But they gave inconsistent and somewhat puzzling answers 
about why mentions of Warner Books and Warner Brothers did not show 
up  in the cover story. One  writer contended somewhat improbably that 
h e  often pays no  attention to the name o f  the company that distributes 
the movies he  reviews. 
The same staffers w h o  denied being influenced by Time Warner’s rela- 
tionship with Scott Turow were, however, quite prepared to believe that 
some of their colleagues might be influenced. Even when those inter- 
viewed did not point to particular examples of tainted self-coverage, they 
acknowledged that it might be happening. All of the Time respondents, 
including the marketing and corporate communication executives, specu- 
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lated that some editors and writers might well be interpreting signals from 
management or articles in the magazine as meaning they would be quiet- 
ly rewarded for writing certain reviews o r  stories in ways that could bene- 
fi t  Time Warner. Three o f  those interviewed were even more specific. 
They voiced a suspicion that in Time Warner’s new environment editors 
and writers were going beyond their traditional fear of investigating the 
firm. They might, the employees argued, quietly-without telling any- 
one-be arranging their writing in response to key Time Warner publicity 
needs with the hope of later rewards from management. Only one re- 
spondent, a writer, admitted that he might do that hirnself in the future. 
I3ut the link hetween silent bargains, silent routines, and self-censorship 
in coverage of Time Warner was quite clear in the comments of all of 
them. 
Assessing the Dynamics of Silence 
Focusing on journalists’ approaches to covering their own organizations, 
the present study argues the need to modify contemporary scholarly con- 
tentions that news firms are accustomed to open conflict between re- 
porters and superiors as a way to work out policy issues. It does not chal- 
lenge the implication by Bantz (1984) ,  Johnson (19931, Lule (19921, and 
others that research of earlier decades tended to underplay policy-related 
conflict in newsrooms. I t  suggests, instead, that there exist particular 
types of circumstances where journalists’ fears for their jobs combine 
with their superiors’ fear of extreme organizational instability to lead both 
parties to avoid, suppress, and otherwise manage conflict in complex 
ways. 
The study suggests that a useful framework for exploring such conflict 
management comes from sociological work on hidden conflicts in organi- 
zations and their relationship to silent bargains. Guided by theoretical 
constructs from these areas, the study tracks some o f  the tensions that 
shape an organization’s self-coverage, maps some of the boundaries o f  
that activity, and speculates on how the process might influence what 
gets o u t  as news and reviews. The findings suggest that the dynamics o f  
conflict about self-coverage are even more complex than the silent-bar- 
gain notion of conflict management would imply. Silent bargains were 
found in superior-subordinate relations, but they were buttressed funda- 
mentally hy silent routines that served to keep the subject o f  self-cover- 
age generally quiescent among writers and reporters without direct man- 
agerial involvement. 
The exploration of self-coverage at 7imemagazine in the wake o f  its 
parent’s purchase o f  Warner serves as a particularly illuminating case. It 
suggests what happens when silent bargains and silent routines that keep 
the subject quiet are severed by events that raise hidden conflict to public 
debate and virtually force self-coverage. Interviews indicate Time Warner 
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management explicitly encouraged their magazine personnel to cover the 
firm in a detached, journalistic manner. At the same time, however, Time 
personnel saw contradictions between those encouragements and the ar- 
ticles their magazine printed. They inferred from the inconsistencies that 
management had instituted a new silent bargain with others in the maga- 
zine’s staff, a bargain in which staff adopted silent routines in exchange 
for status and organizational stability. They had reason to believe that 
covertly-in the silent routines which journalists pretend to one another 
do not exist-a reward system about self-coverage was taking root that 
stressed caution and loyalty along with the increased frequency of organi- 
zational self-coverage. 
The people interviewed at Time Warner denied that they themselves 
had gone against journalistic values in their writings or directives. Still, 
they were quick to add their belief that tensions regarding self-coverage 
which accompanied the merger had led many of their colleagues t o  
strategically and quietly sidestep the firm’s own journalistic norms to pro- 
tect their organizational status. Even if they were wrong about their col- 
leagues, these and other comments acknowledged a basic reorientation 
of perceptions about their company and its members. At  the very least, 
their remarks indicate that the conflicts over self-coverage engendered 
underground suspicions that devalued the credibility of the news periodi- 
cal in the eyes of the very people who were creating it. That in itself may 
be a first step toward refraining from writing about certain items or writ- 
ing about them in certain ways. 
More research is needed to discover whether the dynamics suggested 
by this exploratory study can be noted in other merger and non-merger 
situations. Quantitative studies linking different kinds of mergers t o  
changes in the norms of newsworkers, as well as in the amount and na- 
ture of self-coverage by journalistic outlets involved in the mergers, 
would also be useful. Quantifying evidence of such shifts is likely to be 
difficult, however, because trends are likely to be seen over a long period 
and because connections with the periodical or its parent firm are often 
not indicated in the articles. 
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